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Abstract:   
Research aims: This study aimed to examine the role of a code of ethics and 
clawback incentive schemes to mitigate earnings management intention. This 
study also examined the effect of personal value on the relationship between the 
code of ethics and incentive schemes with earnings management intention. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The research method used in this study was an 
experimental approach with a factorial design of 2x3 between-subjects. The 
subjects were 83 students from the undergraduate and postgraduate of 
Accounting Program from a public university in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. To test the 
hypotheses, two-way ANOVA was used. 
Research findings: This study discovered that the code of ethics was able to 
mitigate earnings management intention. However, it should be completed by 
clear and strict sanctions for ethical violations. The results, however, showed that 
there were no significant different effects between clawback and bonus-only 
incentive schemes on earnings management intention. Additionally, this study 
provided empirical evidence that personal value did not moderate the 
relationship between the code of ethics and incentive schemes on earnings 
management intention. 
Theoretical contribution/Originality: This study showed the causality relationship 
between the code of ethics and incentive scheme with earnings management 
intention through the use of experimental methods. 
Practitioner/Policy implication: This study has important implications for 
company management in designing and implementing a code of ethics 
effectively, namely the company should provide sanctions for those who violate 
the code of ethics.  
Research limitation/Implication: First, this study only examined earnings 
management in the form of real earnings management as the operating 
decisions. Second, most of the data collection was carried out after class, causing 
participants to lack concentration as they were tired of the lessons in class. 
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As a consequence of crimes in various corporations, such as Wr. Grace 
and Co. and McKesson HBOC Inc., the role of the accounting profession is 
spotlighted by the wider community. Wr. Grace and Co. is a specialized 
material and chemical industry located in Colombia, Maryland. This 
company was charged with hiding earnings in reserve accounts in good  
AFFILIATION: 
1
 Department of Accounting, 
Akademi Akuntansi YKPN, Daerah 
Istimewa Yogyakarta, Indonesia. 
 
2 
Department of Accounting, 
Universitas Gadjah Mada,  Daerah 
Istimewa Yogyakarta, Indonesia. 
 
*CORRESPONDENCE:    
erlindanur.kha@gmail.com 
 






Khasanah, E. N. & Sholihin, M. 
(2020). Code of Ethics, Clawback 
Incentive Schemes, and Personal 
Value to Mitigate Earnings 
Management Intention. Journal of 





17 Dec 2019 
Reviewed: 
3 Jan 2020 
Revised: 
19 Mar 2020 
Accepted: 
19 Apr 2020 
 
Khasanah & Sholihin 
Code of Ethics, Clawback Incentive Schemes, and Personal Value… 
 
 
Journal of Accounting and Investment, 2020 | 196 
years and then tapping them in later years to mask actual slowing earnings (Makar, 
Alam, & Pearson, 2000). Meanwhile, McKesson HBOC Inc. entangled in the opposite 
case. This company, engaged in the health industry, allegedly booked premature 
revenues by including in sales figure a substantial list of contracts that had not been 
finalized (Makar et al., 2000). These various examples of corporate crimes have resulted 
in the crisis of public confidence toward the accountant’s professionalism this profession 
has not been able to provide accurate financial information for the community. 
 
Along with the increased corporate crimes in the world, earnings management become 
a hot issue in accounting professionals and researchers (Hossain, Karim, & Eddine, 
2014). Earnings management is a questionable practice in financial reporting to obtain 
personal gains (Schipper, 1989). Earnings management has two opposite consequences, 
namely opportunistic and efficient. It is said as unethical behavior when carried out for 
opportunistic purposes.  
 
Preventing unethical behavior in the workplace is a significant challenge for 
management (Kaptein, 2011). Creating an ethical climate in the work environment by 
providing a code of ethics can be taken as a management effort to prevent unethical 
behavior and to protect shareholders. A code of ethics may lead to appropriate business 
reporting and reliable financial information for shareholders (Kaptein, 2011). 
Management has a responsibility to shareholders to ensure that employees have 
worked ethically. The absence of the code of ethics may indicate that management did 
not consider ethics important (Adams, Tashchian, & Shore, 2001). 
 
Several previous studies showed that the code of ethics was a potential factor affecting 
ethical behavior (McCabe, Trevino, & Butterfield, 1996; Rich, Smith, & Mihale, 1990; 
Schwartz, 2002). Meanwhile, current studies have specifically linked the code of ethics 
to opportunistic behavior, such as an escalation of commitment to failing projects 
(Booth & Schulz, 2004) and moral judgment of budgetary slack (Lucyanda & Sholihin, 
2016). Their studies provided evidence that the code of ethics could mitigate 
opportunistic behavior. However, studies examining whether the code of ethics was 
able to mitigate the other opportunistic behavior, namely earnings management 
intention, have not been widely explored. Therefore, this study aimed to fill this 
literature gap. Moreover, this study examined the issue using a different method from a 
similar study conducted by Chen, Gotti, Kang, and Wolfe (2016). Using an experimental 
method, this study was expected to contribute, especially validating that of Chen et al. 
(2016) study through the use of the different method. It was supported by Davidson and 
Stevens (2013), stating that current literature provides little empirical or theoretical 
support on the effectiveness of a code of ethics in an experimental settings. Therefore, 
the first objective of this study is to examine the role of the code of ethics in mitigating 
earnings management intention. 
 
Several companies have implemented sanctions for the offenders of the code of ethics, 
but others have not. The implementation of sanctions showed that offending code of 
ethics is a serious problem (Brooks, 1989). Without sufficient procedures and policies to 
reduce unethical and illegal activities, the effectiveness of the code of ethics would be 
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weak (Garegnani, Merlotti, & Russo, 2015). Sanctions for the code of ethics violations by 
members of the organization are necessary to achieve its implementation effectiveness. 
Therefore, this study examined whether the implementation of the code of ethics, along 
with sanctions to the offenders, leads to different results compared to those without 
sanctions. 
 
Incentives also had an important role in earnings management (Bergstresser & 
Philippon, 2006). Previous studies have examined the effect of incentive and earnings 
management, but the results were still inconsistent. On the one hand, several studies, 
such as Reitenga, Buchheit, Yin, and Baker (2002); Burns and Kedia (2006); and Jouber 
and Fakhfakh (2014), provided empirical evidence on the relationship between incentive 
and earnings management. On the other hand, Beaudoin, Cianci, and Tsakumis (2015) 
and Laux and Laux (2009) did not find evidence that increased incentives can improve 
earnings management. Therefore, a research is required to provide empirical evidence 
related to determining the right incentive schemes to mitigate earnings management. 
This study examined whether the clawback incentive scheme could mitigate earnings 
management intention. Clawback is defined as recovering the CEO and CFO’s incentive 
compensation if the restatement of accounting is attributed to intentional misconduct 
(Iskandar-Datta & Jia, 2013).  
 
Empirically, several studies provided evidence on the effectiveness of implementing 
clawback that it increased accounting quality and lower audit risk (Chan, Chen, Chen, & 
Yu, 2012); reduced financial misstatements and increased investors’ confidence on 
earnings information (Chan, Chen, Chen, & Yu, 2015); and could mitigate budgetary 
slack (Purnama & Sholihin, 2017). The latest study on the clawback provision to curb 
earnings management was conducted by Sari and Sholihin (2019). Their study examined 
the interaction effect of clawback and religiosity on earnings management. The results 
provided empirical evidence that the interaction of religiosity and clawback had a 
significant effect. However, Sari and Sholihin (2019) only examined the interaction effect 
of religiosity and clawback on earnings management without examining the main effect 
of clawback. Therefore, this study empirically examined the extent to which the main 
effects of the clawback incentive scheme could mitigate earnings management 
intention. 
 
Currently, limited studies were examining the interaction between organizational and 
personal factors on individual ethical decision making. The decision-making process is 
complex as it involves individual, organizational, and contextual issues (Jones, 1991). 
Moreover, the previous study of Ferrell and Gresham (1985) stated that individual 
factors (one of them is value) might interact with organizational factors in influencing 
ethical decision-making dilemmas. The interaction effect of personal values with 
organizational factors had been examined by Shafer, Morris, and Ketchand (2001). Their 
study examined these factors in the professional auditor’s ethical decision process 
context. Hence, this study was intended to examine these factors concerning the other 
accounting context, namely, earnings management intention. Therefore, the third 
objective of this study was to examine the effect of personal value on the relationship 
between the code of ethics and incentive schemes on earnings management intention. 
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This study used an experimental research method with a factorial design of 2x3 
between-subjects. The subjects were 83 students from the undergraduate and 
postgraduate of Accounting Program from a public university in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. 
To test the hypotheses, this study used two-way ANOVA. This study found out that the 
code of ethics was able to mitigate earnings management intention. However, it should 
be completed by clear and strict sanctions. The results, however, showed that there 
were no significant different effects between clawback and bonus-only incentive 
schemes on earnings management intention. This study also provided empirical 
evidence that personal value did not moderate the relationship between the code of 
ethics and incentive schemes on earnings management intention. 
 
This study has important implications for company management in designing and 
implementing a code of ethics effectively. This study suggests a company should design  
a code of ethics and to implement it effectively, it should be complemented with 
sanctions for those who violate the code of ethics. In terms of methodology, this study 
might show the causality relationship between the code of ethics and incentive scheme 
with earnings management intention through the use of the experimental method, 
which differs from the previous study by Chen et al. (2016), Chan et al. (2012); Chan et 
al. (2015), Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) and Pyzoha (2015) that used secondary data. 
 
This paper consists of several sections. The next section describes the literature review 
and hypotheses development. The third section is the research method describing the 
experimental design, research subject and experiment task, definition of operational 
variable and measurement variable, and data analysis technique. The fourth section 
presents results and discussion, and the final section presents conclusions, limitations, 
and suggestions for future research. 
 
 




Earnings management is a questionable practice in financial reporting to obtain personal 
gains (Schipper, 1989). Earnings management is generally conducted to attain a certain 
level of reported earnings (Gavious, Segev, & Yosef, 2012). There are two perspectives 
of earnings management, opportunistic and efficient. Based on the opportunistic point 
of view, managers manipulate earnings to increase their interests, including increasing 
income and earnings and hiding “bad news”, which can result in loss of bonuses or even 
being fired (Callen, Morel, & Richardson, 2011). Opportunistic reporting behavior is 
designed to mislead some stakeholders to affect contractual outcomes with the intent 
of obtaining some private gains (Chen et al., 2016). Based on these motivations, it can 
be said that earnings management is the managers’ opportunistic behavior due to an 
opportunity for managers/accountants to “manage” reported earnings (Bergstresser & 
Philippon, 2006). Meanwhile, based on the efficient point of view, several studies argue 
that earnings management may be beneficial because it is potential to improve the 
value of earnings through informing private information to stockholders and the public 
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(Jiraporn, Miller, Yoon, & Kim, 2008; Rezaei & Roshani, 2012). Under the condition 
where managers and shareholders are working in the same interest, managers will 
improve the firm’s value and try to give their best prediction of future performance, 
therefore smoothing earnings presents a reasonable signal to outside investors (Putra, 
Pagalung, & Habbe, 2018). 
 
Earnings management practice is classified into two types, those involving changing 
accounting methods, and those involving operating decisions (Fischer & Rosenzweig, 
1995). Earnings management is related to changing accounting methods when 
management change policies of the company’s accounting method to record 
transactions, such as changing the method of fixed asset depreciation, changing the 
method of a long-term contract, changing the method to record inventory, and changing 
the method to calculate production costs. The second type of earnings management is 
operating decisions, which involve delaying or accelerating recognition of transactions. 
The examples are offering special terms to customers at year-end to advance next year’s 
sales (Fischer & Rosenzweig, 1995), accelerating or delaying expenditures for 
promotions, and research and development cost up to the next accounting period. 
 
Code of Ethics 
 
A code of ethics is a document guiding the behavior of all the members of an 
organization (Rodriguez-Dominguez, Gallego-Alvarez, & Garcia-Sanchez, 2009). 
Accountants are usually bound by the profession’s code of ethics, which guides 
employees in carrying out their job professionally and ethically (Ghazali, 2015). A code 
of ethics is essential as it implicitly limits unethical behaviors and is intended to guide 
people in ambiguous situations (Pflugrath, Martinov-Bennie, & Chen, 2007). In a 
corporation, a code of ethics is the foundation of ethics programs, and its contents could 
be critical in the development of a culture of ethics (Singh, 2015). The absence of a code 
of ethics, therefore, may indicate that management did not consider the code of ethics 
and ethical behavior essential (Adams et al., 2001). The code of ethics was designed to 
guide companies to become more socially responsible, provide guidelines for 
employees’ behavior, improve company management, comply with government 
guidelines, and establish a better corporate culture (Cleek & Leonard, 1998). The 
company implements the code of ethics and uses it as a tool to reduce ambiguity, 
promote ethical practices, and establish a strong ethical (Ibrahim, Angelidis, & Tomic, 
2009).  
 
A code of ethics is a form of management accountability to shareholders to ensure that 
all employees in the company have worked ethically. The company is responsible to 
shareholders, and all employees' behavior must be aimed at maximizing shareholder 
value without breaking the law. Therefore, the purpose of an organization adopting a 
code of ethics is to satisfy its shareholders (Rodriguez-Dominguez et al., 2009). A code of 
ethics is a management effort to protect shareholders’ interests and maximize their 
values. Meanwhile, (Wotruba, Chonko, & Loe, 2001) stated that the important reason 
for the company to have and to implement the code of ethics is to look for legitimacy, 
protect shareholders’ interest, and improve its reputation to increase public trust. 
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Garegnani et al. (2015) stated that a code of ethics has high quality if there is a preface 
by top management in which the relationship between shareholders covered and 
regulated in the code of ethics includes the requirement to produce appropriate 
financial information for shareholders. To achieve a high-quality code of ethics, 
involvement of various parties is required, especially of the top management, and 
commitment to ethical programs (Garegnani et al., 2015). Other stakeholders, such as 
shareholders, consumers, suppliers, competitors, society, government, and other 
interest groups, also have the moral right to participate in the process of making ethical 
codes (Schwartz, 2002). 
 
A code of ethics was created as a guide for organization members to do their tasks. It 
was an appropriate mechanism to encourage responsible behavior (Rodriguez-
Dominguez et al., 2009). The increasing number of companies having the code of ethics 
(Chen et al., 2016) is followed by the growing research about the effectiveness of the 
code of ethics for members’ behavior in the organization. Several studies showed that 
the code of ethics is a potential factor that can influence ethical behavior (McCabe et al., 
1996; Rich et al., 1990; Schwartz, 2002).  
 
Previous studies of Booth and Schulz (2004), Chen et al. (2016), and Lucyanda and 
Sholihin (2016) showed that the code of ethics has an essential role in directing ethical 
behavior of employees to achieve company’s goal, including preventing intention to 
behave opportunistically. A high-quality code of ethics in organizations would play a role 
in constraining potential opportunistic behavior (Chen et al., 2016). The instrumental 
perspective in compliance theory assumes that individuals shape their behavior in 
response to changes in impulses and penalties associated with the laws (Tyler, 1990). In 
order to achieve the effectiveness of the code of ethics, it must be supported by clear 
sanctions (Booth & Schulz, 2004). Sanctions can be used as a deterrent to unethical 
actions (Adams et al., 2001) hence individuals have a strong tendency to avoid behavior 
contradicting or violating the code of ethics. Conversely, if the code of ethics is not 
supported by clear and strict sanctions, it is unlikely that it will be effective. Company 
members know that the code of ethics functions as guidance to behave, but they still 
have the freedom to behave in any way, as long as there are no sanctions. The code of 
ethics, therefore, will not have a deterrent effect on offenders. Meanwhile, the absence 
of the code of ethics means the company does not have guidelines for its members to 
behave ethically, including avoiding opportunistic behavior intention, such as earnings 
management. Earnings management intention may increase when there is no code of 
ethics, or there is a code of ethics but without sanctions. Thus, the following hypotheses 
are tested. 
 
H1a: Individuals will tend to have earnings management intention when there is no code 
of ethics, compared to when there is a code of ethics with sanctions.  
 
H1b: Individuals will tend to have earnings management intention when there is no code 
of ethics, compared to when there is a code of ethics without sanctions.  
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H1c: Individuals will tend to have earnings management intention when there is a code of 





Incentive compensation is one of three components of the manager’s total 
compensation package (Anthony & Govindarajan, 2007). An incentive is used by 
organizations to ensure employees’ commitment to suit organizational goals (Chenhall, 
2003; Crocker & Slemrod, 2007). Initially, the clawback policy was voluntary. Between 
2003 until early 2010, more than 300 firms in the Fortune 1000 and more than 70 in the 
Fortune 100 adopted clawback (Chen, Greene, & Owers, 2015). Furthermore, clawback 
had become mandatory after the publication of the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 (Hirsch, 
Reichert, & Sohn, 2017). The clawback policy stated in the Dodd-Frank Act, a financial 
regulation law in the United States, requires public firms to adopt policies encouraging 
certain types of recovery from overpayments made by executives based on financial 
results that turned out to be false and require restatement (Fried & Shilon, 2011). 
 
Clawback is defined as recovering the CEO and CFO’s incentive compensation if the 
restatement of accounting is attributed to intentional misconduct (Iskandar-Datta & Jia, 
2013). There are several benefits if a company adopts a clawback policy. Clawback is 
expected to improve compensation arrangements in public companies (Fried & Shilon, 
2011). It can also assign the board on the side that potentially protects the company’s 
assets in investor’s interests so that it can align shareholders’ interests (Addy, Chu, & 
Yoder, 2014; Brown, Davis-Friday, Guler, & Marquardt, 2015). Moreover, the important 
reason for adopting the clawback policy is that without it, the executives will continue to 
receive compensation despite poor performance (Dehaan, Hodge, & Shevlin, 2013). 
 
Previous studies, such as Beaudoin et al. (2015); Jouber and Fakhfakh (2014); Laux and 
Laux (2009); and Reitenga et al. (2002), have examined the relationship between 
incentive schemes and earnings management. Higher incentive equity encourages 
managers to conduct earnings management (Cheng & Warfield, 2005). CEO, whose 
overall compensation is more sensitive to the company’s stock price, will cause a higher 
level of earnings management (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006). Managers often 
conduct unethical behaviors for personal gains, such as earnings management. 
Shareholders set appropriate incentives for managers to ensure that managers will not 
take certain actions that can harm shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, 
the incentive scheme is required to mitigate earnings management intention. One of the 
appropriate incentive schemes in mitigating earnings management is clawback, namely 
incentives containing penalties for misstatements in financial statements. Clawback has 
been found able to reduce financial misstatements (Pyzoha, 2015), increase investor’s 
confidence on earnings information (Chan et al., 2015), decrease in fraud risk (Fung, 
Raman, Sun, & Xu, 2015), and increase accounting quality and reduce audit risk (Chan et 
al., 2012).  
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This study compared clawback and bonus-only incentive schemes. In the bonus-only 
scheme, individuals would be given bonuses without the bonus-return penalty for 
misstatements in financial statements. Meanwhile, clawback has a restraining effect on 
risk-taking compared to bonus-only contracts (Hirsch et al., 2017). Prospect theory 
stated that individuals would tend to avoid risks in choices involving specific gain 
(positive domains) and take risks in choices involving certain losses (negative domains) 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Individuals will likely have a higher tendency to avoid 
earnings management when given a clawback incentive because it provides a penalty if 
it was proven to misstate financial statements. In other words, individuals will be less 
motivated to manipulate earnings in financial statements if the incentive provided is in 
the form of clawback rather than bonus-only. Thus, hypothesis 2 is formulated as 
follows. 
 
H2: Individuals will tend to have earnings management intention when given incentives 





Values are the center of individuals’ thinking, and therefore play a role in the formation 
of attitudes and the implementation of intentional behavior in many situations and 
issues (Rokeach, 1973). Value is used to guide and encourage individuals to behave in a 
way that is ethical or unethical (Pohling, Bzdok, Eigenstetter, Stumpf, & Strobel, 2016). 
Value is necessary to identify specific personal values in accordance with the accounting 
profession (Shafer et al., 2001) as it will ease them to behave ethically in the work 
environment.  
 
Scott (1965) developed scales that could be used to measure personal value. In this 
study, the measurement of personal values referred to personal value instruments 
adopted from Akaah and Lund (1994). They chose four sub-scales, namely 
intellectualism, honesty, self-control, and religiousness. They were chosen because they 
seemed relevant to the study topic on ethics (Akaah & Lund, 1994). The explanation of 
these sub-scales in the instrument is as follows (Alleyne, Cadogan-McClean, & Harper, 
2013). 
 
1. Intellectualism: Individuals have the ability for understanding, thinking, and 
reasoning.  
2. Honesty: Conditions of being trustworthy, genuine, and sincere  
3. Self-control: Ability to hold back or control individuals’ feelings, emotions, and 
reactions  
4. Religiousness: Belief in worship or obedience to the power considered to have 
control over human destiny 
 
Decision making in business and organizational contexts are also determined by the 
personal value (Shafer et al., 2001). Therefore, this study examined the interaction 
effect between the code of ethics and personal value on earnings management 
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intention. (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985) stated that individual factors (one of which is value) 
might interact with organizational factors to influence individuals involved in an 
ethical/unethical decision-making dilemma. The decision-making process is complex 
because it involves individual, organizational, and contextual issues (Jones, 1991). If an 
organization has facilitated individuals to behave ethically by creating a conducive 
ethical climate, it will not be optimal if individuals’ factors do not support it.  
 
Several previous studies had shown that the code of ethics influenced ethical behavior 
decisions (Adams et al., 2001; McCabe et al., 1996; Schwartz, 2002). Individuals will 
avoid having unethical opportunistic behavior when an organization/company has a 
code of ethics. The code of ethics clearly states that there are prohibitions on 
opportunistic behavior, which can damage professionalism. Moreover, individuals will 
be given sanctions when proven to have violated the code of ethics. It will be 
strengthened by higher personal values (intellectualism, honesty, self-control, and 
religiousness) they have. The existence of organizational factors in the form of the code 
of ethics and individual factors, namely high personal value, will increasingly encourage 
individuals not to have earnings management intention. Conversely, although there is a 
code of ethics in the organization, without sanctions, or even there is no code of ethics 
regulating the prohibition of opportunistic behavior, there is likely to be an increase in 
earnings management intention. Brief, Dukerich, Brown, & Brett (1996) argued that 
personal and organizational factors might impact the probability of individuals engaged 
in fraudulent financial reporting. Thus, hypothesis 3 is formulated as follows. 
 




Personal values are one of many variables that potentially influence the moral 
perception of agents on the interests of shareholders involved (Shafer et al., 2001). 
Values differ from other personal attributes because they are inherent and encourage 
individuals to behave in certain situations (Adams, Licht, & Sagiv, 2011). Previous studies 
did not examine the joint effect between incentive schemes and personal values on 
earnings management intention (Beaudoin et al., 2015; Brief et al., 1996). This study 
suspects that an incentive scheme without penalty for returning incentives due to 
misstatements in financial reporting, and the low personal value of individuals will 
encourage and strengthen them to have higher earnings management intention. 
Individuals tend to pursue their interests, namely bonuses, based on achievement of 
performance. The absence of penalties for returning incentives due to misstatements in 
the financial statements will further encourage individuals to have a higher intention of 
earnings management. Thus, hypothesis 4 is formulated as follows. 
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Research Method 
 
This study applied an experimental research design to test the hypotheses. This design is 
widely used to show causality relationships (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). A 3x2 factorial 
experiment was used in this study. The code of ethics variable was manipulated into 
three manipulations, namely “code of ethics with sanctions”, “code of ethics without 
sanctions”, and “without code of ethics” in accordance with instruments developed by 
Lucyanda and Sholihin (2016). The incentive scheme variable was manipulated by 
providing incentives to participants in the form of “bonus-only” and “clawback” (Hirsch 
et al., 2017). Meanwhile, this study did not manipulate the personal value variable as it 
was measured using four sub-scales of the personal values scale (PVS) developed by 
Scott (1965). The reason for using the PVS was because it was relevant to this research 
topic on ethics (Akaah & Lund, 1994). 
 
The subjects of this study were undergraduate and postgraduate students of the 
Accounting Program, Faculty of Economics and Business from a public university in 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
1
. The research subjects were students as surrogates of 
practitioners because research assignments given did not require professional 
experience. The subject received treatment and assigned randomly into 6 groups. 
Randomization was used to ensure that subjects have been placed in the experimental 
or control group randomly without regarding inherent factors of the subject (Nahartyo 
& Utami, 2016). 
 
The experimental tasks are as follows. First, subjects were asked to fill out the consent 
form as a research participant. Second, the subjects read information about their role as 
finance director in a manufacturing company. Third, subjects were asked to read on an 
experimental case and fill in response to reject or support to do earnings management. 
Then, they answered some manipulation check questions. Manipulation checks were 
performed to ascertain that all of the subjects have received manipulation with 
measures and forms designed by the researcher (Nahartyo & Utami, 2016). For the code 
of ethics treatment, this study asked questions “Does Semen Baturatu Company has a 
code of ethics?”, “Does Semen Baturatu’s code of ethics arrange sanctions for ethical 
violations committed by the board of directors, employees, and company 
representatives?”. For incentive schemes, this study asked a question, “Must you return 
a bonus incentive of 80% if your company is proven to have made a misstatement in the 
financial statement?” If the participants’ answers were not in accordance with the 
treatments given, then the answers would be excluded from the data analysis. It showed 
that participants could not internalize the treatments provided. Finally, subjects were 
asked to fill out the questionnaire and complete the demographic data. 
 
The dependent variable was the earnings management intention. Earnings management 
intention is intent opportunistic behavior committed by individuals to increased 
earnings reported in financial statements to receive personal gain. A modified Clikeman 
                                                          
1
 ANCOVA test showed that student’s level (undergraduate vs postgraduate) did not significantly affect 
earnings management (p = 0,688) 
Khasanah & Sholihin 
Code of Ethics, Clawback Incentive Schemes, and Personal Value… 
 
 
Journal of Accounting and Investment, 2020 | 205 
and Henning (2000)’s instrument was used to measure this variable. This study made 
some modifications to this instrument to adjust to an Indonesian company context. In 
Clikeman and Henning (2000)’s instrument, participants were assumed to be as vice 
president in the manufacturing company while this study substituted the role of 
participants as financial director. Then, the phrase “for winter days” in “Your company is 
closed for the last two weeks of December this year for winter days” was omitted to 
adjust to the condition in Indonesia. This variable was measured using the 7-point scale 
(1 is “very opposed to delays” and 7 is “strongly supported delays”). 
 
The independent variables included the code of ethics and incentive schemes. The code 
of ethics is guidance about norms for behavior and has been agreed upon by 
organization members. This study used Lucyanda and Sholihin (2016)’s instrument to 
manipulate the code of ethics variable. It consisted of three manipulations, namely 
“code of ethics with sanctions”, “code of ethics without sanctions”, and “without code 
of ethics”. The incentive scheme is an incentive designed by companies to motivate 
employees with goals congruence and generally in financial form. This variable was 
manipulated by providing information on bonus-only and clawback incentives to 
participants, such as the manipulation of the experimental study of Hirsch et al. (2017). 
Bonus-only manipulation showed that bonus is given based on financial targets, such as 
profits. Meanwhile, clawback manipulation showed bonus information along with the 
penalty in the form of returning 80% of the total bonus for misstatements in financial 
statements. The amount of bonus return was based on Pyzoha (2015)’s experimental 
manipulation, which was 80% of the total bonus received. 
 
The moderating variable was personal value. Personal values are individual beliefs about 
certain standards, which can be used to make ethical decisions. This study used the PVS 
instrument adopted from Akaah and Lund (1994)’s study to measure the variable. Their 
study used personal values consisting of four sub-scales (intellectualism, self-control, 
honesty, and religiousness) developed by Scott (1965). Participants were asked to 
provide their evaluation of 23 statements on the 7-point scale, ranging from “very 
opposed to delays” (code 1) and “strongly supported delays” (code 7). 
 
Data analysis consisted of descriptive analysis, validity and reliability test, assumption of 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), analysis of covariate (ANCOVA), and hypothesis testing 
using two-way ANOVA. Descriptive statistics consisted of sum, average, and standard 
deviation of data. A business ethics expert’s assessment used in this study aims to 
increase instrument validity. Meanwhile, to test the construct validity of personal value 
instruments, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used. A reliability test was carried 
out to show the consistency of the instrument. 
 
Before testing hypotheses 1 and 2, ANOVA assumptions consisting of normality, 
homogeneity, and randomization were carried out. Moreover, this study also conducted 
an ANCOVA to examine the relationship between individuals’ demographic 
characteristics on the dependent variable. Test of hypotheses 1 and 2 was conducted by 
the two-way ANOVA. For hypothesis 1, if the results of the two-way ANOVA were 
significant, further analysis was required to determine the significance of differences in 
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each group. It could be done by the posthoc test. Meanwhile, the two-way ANOVA was 
also used to test hypotheses 3 and 4, aiming to examine the interaction effect. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Manipulation Check and Participant Characteristics 
 
Before conducting experiments, this study conducted a pilot test to 53 students from 
the Master of Science in Accounting Program, Faculty of Economics and Business from a 
public university in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Of 53 participants, 83% (44 participants) 
completed all of the questions and statements in experimental material and passed 
manipulation check. The results showed that the pilot test was quite good because most 
participants had understood well the research instrument given.  
 
A total of 95 participants took part in this experiment. Participants who succeeded in 
answering all of the experimental materials were 94.67% (91 participants), and 5.33% (4 
participants) failed to answer instruction in experimental materials. Thus, 91 
participants could be further analyzed. Furthermore, manipulation checks were 
conducted to ensure that the participants have internalized to the treatment given. Of 
the 91 participants, 8.02% (8 participants) failed, resulting in 91.98% (83 participants) 
passing the manipulation check. 
 
Table 1 Participants’ Demographic Characteristics 
 Total Percentage (%) 
Gender 
Male 34 41 
Female 49 59 
Total 83 100 
Age 
≤ 22 years 59 71.1 
23-35 years 24 28.9 
Total 83 100 
Study Program 
Undergraduate 58 69.9 
Postgraduate (Master of Accounting) 25 30.1 
Total 83 100 
Work Experience 
0-5 years 78 94 
5-10 years 5 6 
Total 83 100 
 
The participants consisted of 34 male (41%) and 49 female (59%) students. Participants 
had an age range of ≤ 22 years were 59 (71.1%), and 23-35 years were 24 (28.9%) 
students. Furthermore, participants were students taking the undergraduate Accounting 
Program and postgraduate Accounting Program (Master of Accounting). Of the 83 
participants, 58 (69.9%) were undergraduate students, and 25 (30.1%) were 
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postgraduate students. Seventy-eight (78%) participants had 0-5 years of work 
experience, and 5 (6%) participants had work experience of 5-10 years. Table 1 shows 




Before testing the hypotheses, this study examined the validity and reliability of the 
personal value instrument. This study also conducted the ANOVA assumption and 
ANCOVA test. Based on CFA results, KMO-MSA and Bartlett values of the sphericity test 
were 0.674 (more than 0.50) and 0.000 (significant), respectively. The factor 
interpretation used a factor rotation. The rotated component matrix results formed four 
factors, and six items were excluded from the analysis for having a loading factor under 
0.50. Hence, 17 other items proven valid statistically. Meanwhile, constructing items of 
the personal value resulted in Cronbach’s coefficient alpha of 0.780 (more than 0.60). 
Thus, it can be said that the personal value instrument was reliable. 
 
The ANOVA assumption consisted of normality, homogeneity, and randomization test. 
The normality test showed a significance value of 0.149 (more than 0.05) that the 
residual was normally distributed. Levene test result showed that the significance of 
variance homogeneity was 0.072 (more than 0.05), indicating that samples had the 
same variance. Whereas randomization results showed that all of the demographic 
characteristics had Person Chi-Square values above 0.05, thus providing evidence that 
randomization had been carried out. Moreover, this study also conducted an ANCOVA 
test by examining the demographic characteristics of the dependent variable. Based on 
the results, all of the demographic characteristics, including gender, age, study program, 
and work experience, did not significantly influence earnings management intention 
(significance value above 0.05). 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Codes of ethics Total 
Code of ethics 
with sanctions 
Code of ethics 
without 
sanctions 






(N = 13) 
Mean = 2.15 
Std. Dev = 
0.899 
(N = 14) 
Mean = 4.50 
Std. Dev = 
1.557 
(N = 14) 
Mean = 3.71 
Std. Dev = 1.437 
(N = 41) 
Mean = 3.49 




(N = 15) 
Mean = 2.87 
Std. Dev = 
1.598 
(N = 13) 
Mean = 3.08 
Std. Dev = 
1.498 
(N = 14) 
Mean = 4.07 
Std. Dev = 1.685 
(N = 42) 
Mean = 3.33 
Std. Dev = 
1.648 
Total (N = 28) 
Mean = 2.54 
Std. Dev = 
1.347 
(N = 27) 
Mean = 3,81 
Std. Dev = 
1.665 
(N = 28) 
Mean = 3.89 
Std. Dev = 1.548 
(N = 83) 
Mean = 3.41 
Std. Dev = 
1.631 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of each group. Overall, 41 participants received a 
bonus-only incentive scheme treatment with an average earnings management 
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intention, and standard deviations were 3.49 and 1.630, respectively. Forty-two 
participants obtained a clawback incentive scheme. The average earnings management 
intention on this incentive scheme was 3.33, with a standard deviation of 1.648. 
Meanwhile, 28 participants received a code of ethics with sanctions treatment. The 
average earnings management intention and standard deviation were 2.54 and 1.347, 
respectively. Participants having a code of ethics without sanctions treatment had an 
average value of earnings management intention of 3.81, with a standard deviation of 
1.665. The total participants receiving this treatment was 27. Participants receiving 
without a code of ethics treatment showed that the average value of earnings 
management intention was 3.89. The standard deviation value was 1.548. The number 
of participants receiving this treatment was 28. 
 
The results of the two-way ANOVA and post-hoc tests are shown in Table 3 and 4, 
respectively. 
 
Table 3 Result of Two-Way ANOVA 
Variable F Sig. 
Code of Ethics 7.651 0.001 
Incentive Schemes 0.132 0.718 
R square = 0.231 (Adjusted R Square = 0.181) 
 
A two-way ANOVA was used to test hypotheses 1 and 2, resulting in the F-value = 7.561 
and p-value= 0.001. Furthermore, post-hoc tests were conducted to find out which 
groups differ significantly. The post-hoc results showed significant differences in 
earnings management intention between without a code of ethics group and code of 
ethics with sanctions group. The average difference between these groups was 1.36, 
with a significance value of 0.003. Thus, hypothesis 1a was supported. The post-hoc 
results also showed differences in earnings management intention made by groups 
receiving without a code of ethics and a code of ethics without sanctions treatment. The 
average difference in earnings management intention between these groups was 0.08, 
withasignificance level of 0.979. The difference was statistically insignificant. Therefore, 
hypothesis 1b was not supported.  
 
Table 4 Result of Post-Hoc Tests 







Code of ethics without sanctions 0.398 0.08 
Code of ethics with sanctions 0.394 1.36
*
 
Code of ethics 
without 
sanctions 
Without code of ethics 0.398 -0.08 
Code of ethics with sanctions 0.398 1.28
*
 
Code of ethics 
with sanctions 
Without code of ethics 0.394 -1.36
*
 




Moreover, this result also showed a significant difference between the code of ethics 
without the sanctions group and the code of ethics with the sanctions group. The 
average difference between these groups was 1.28, with a significant value of 0.005. 
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Therefore, hypothesis 1c was supported. Furthermore, the two-way ANOVA test for 
hypothesis 2 stated that the group of clawback and bonus-only showed insignificant 
results (F-value = 0.132 and p-value= 0.718). Therefore, hypothesis 2 was not supported.  
 
The result of the two-way ANOVA for hypotheses 3 is presented in the Table 3. The two-
way ANOVA was also used to determine the moderating effect of personal value 
variables on the relationship between the code of ethics and incentive schemes with 
earnings management intention (hypotheses 3 and 4). The two-way ANOVA test results 
provided evidence that the interaction of the code of ethics and personal values showed 
insignificant value (p-value = 0.174). Therefore, it could be concluded that the personal 
value variable was not a moderating variable. Thus, hypothesis 3 was not supported.  
 
Table 5 Result of Two-Way ANOVA 
Variable F Sig. 
Code of Ethics * Personal Value 1.788 0.174 
R square = 0.194 (Adjusted R Square = 0.143) 
 
Meanwhile, the interaction of incentive schemes and personal values showed 
insignificant value (p-value= 0.220). Hence, it could be concluded that the personal value 
variable was not a moderating variable. Thus, hypothesis 4 was not supported. The 
result of the two-way ANOVA for hypothesis 4 is shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 Result of Two-Way ANOVA 
Variable F Sig 
Incentive Schemes * Personal Value 1.529 0.220 
R square = 0.045 (Adjusted R Square = 0.010) 
 
Code of Ethics and Earnings Management Intention 
 
The statistic result showed that H1a was supported. It indicated that when individuals 
were not given the code of ethics, they would have a higher earnings management 
intention compared to those given the code of ethics with sanctions. The individuals 
tended to avoid unethical behavior due to strict sanctions. This result confirmed the 
compliance theory proposed by Tyler (1990). The instrumental perspective in this theory 
assumed that individuals shaped their behavior in response to changes impulses and 
penalties associated with the laws (Tyler, 1990). This result was also supported by a 
study conducted by Lucyanda and Sholihin (2016), showing that individuals supported 
by a code of ethics with sanctions would see budgetary slack as unethical behavior 
compared to those who did not get a code of ethics. 
 
The statistic result implied that H1b was not supported. There was a slight difference in 
earnings management intention between a group not given a code of ethics and a group 
given a code of ethics without sanctions. This result was consistent with Ford, Gray, and 
Landrum (1982)’s study, discovering slight differences in the decision to behave 
between two groups, namely group with the code of ethics and without the code of 
ethics. Their study concluded that the code of ethics was mostly ineffective. No 
sanctions for violations caused the ineffectiveness of the code of ethics. It was in 
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accordance with a study conducted by Booth and Schulz (2004)stating that to achieve 
the effectiveness of the code of ethics, codes must be supported by clear sanctions.  
 
The statistic result showed that H1c was supported. It indicated that sanctions in the 
code of ethics were effective means of mitigating earnings management intention. 
Garegnani et al. (2015) stated that the effectiveness of the code of ethics would weaken 
due to the absence of adequate compliance procedures and policies to reduce unethical 
and illegal actions. An important procedure and policy that should be considered by the 
organization were feedback in the form of sanctions for violations. This result confirmed 
an instrumental perspective in compliance theory in which individuals shaped their 
behavior in response to changes impulses and penalties associated with the laws (Tyler, 
1990). 
 
Incentive Schemes and Earnings Management Intention 
 
Based on statistic results, a group of a clawback incentive scheme had a smaller earnings 
management intention than the bonus-only incentive scheme group. However, 
differences in earnings management intention of the two groups showed insignificant 
results. Thus H2 was not supported. It indicated that individuals did not feel a dilemma 
when the incentive scheme was resolved with a refund penalty for a misstatement in 
financial statements. This hypothesis was not supported since the purpose of this study 
differed from previous ones. For example, a study by Chan et al. (2015) compared the 
effects of a clawback policy on substitution of accrual manipulation with real transaction 
management. Meanwhile, this study only examined the effect of clawback on a type of 
earnings management, namely real transaction earnings in the form of operating 
decisions. Earnings management in operating decisions had a higher tolerance than 
earnings management in the form of accounting manipulation (Fischer & Rosenzweig, 
1995). Thus, the effect of the bonus return penalty for a misstatement in the financial 
statements was unlikely to differ significantly in the behavior of real earnings 
management compared to the absence of a bonus return (bonus only).  
 
The Interaction between the Code of Ethics, Incentive Schemes and Personal Value to 
Earnings Management Intention 
 
Based on the statistic results, H3 and H4 were not supported. It means that personal 
values did not moderate the relationship between the code of ethics and incentive 
schemes with earnings management intention. According to the synthesis of ethical 
decision-making models by Jones (1991), ethical decision making is a contingent issue 
involving various factors, such as environment (social, cultural, economic, and 
organizational), individual, situation, opportunity, and others. It showed that not only 
individual factors as moderating, but there were also other moderating factors, namely 
the situation. Situational factors include elements of job context, organizational culture, 
and characteristics of work (Jones, 1991). Even though individuals have been given a 
code of ethics, specific incentive schemes, and have high personal values, they would 
still consider certain situations in the work environment when facing ethical decision-
making dilemmas. For example, situations when getting superiors or co-workers’ 
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pressures also have an important role in determining individuals’ intention to behave in 





This study aimed to examine the role of the code of ethics and incentive schemes in 
mitigating earnings management intention and also to examine the influence of 
personal values toward the relationship of the code of ethics and incentive schemes 
with earnings management. This study provided empirical evidence that the code of 
ethics could mitigate individuals’ earnings management intention. Therefore, the code 
of ethics was essential to consider to prevent opportunistic behavior in the company. It 
would be more effective when it was complemented by clear and strict sanctions. 
Sanctions would give a deterrent effect on violators. Conversely, the absence of 
sanctions would likely cause company members to ignore the code of ethics as there 
was no feedback. However, this study did not find significant differences between 
clawback and bonus-only incentive schemes on earnings management intention. This 
study only examined the effect of a clawback incentive scheme on a type of earnings 
management, namely real transaction earnings in the form of operating decisions. 
Therefore, a clawback incentive scheme could not have a significant impact on the type 
of earnings management used in this study. The next finding was that personal values 
did not moderate the relationship between the code of ethics and incentive schemes on 
earnings management intention. In ethical decision making, individuals did not only 
depend on individuals and organizational factors but involved complex factors, such as 
situation and context. 
 
This study has several limitations. First, it only examined earnings management in the 
form of real earnings management as the operating decisions. It is possible to generalize 
the topic of earnings management. Therefore, further research can examine earnings 
management practice as a whole. Second, most of the data collection was carried out 
after class, causing participants to lack concentration as they were tired of the lessons in 
class. Further research can consider more appropriate experiment times so that 
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